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What Does Desert Cost? 
Evaluating Moriarty’s rationale for the asymmetry of desert
    Desert at work. The feast of St. Nicholas, Jan Havicksz. Steen, 1665-1668.
1. Introduction
Many paintings of Jan Steen have a message. This depiction of a Dutch St. 
Nicolas celebration is no exception. Already since the thirteenth century, 
legend has it that the name-giver of the feast delivers a present in the shoe 
of Dutch children some time in December. St. Nicholas must have made 
an exception to his standard delivery method for the girl at the center of the 
painting. She can scarcely carry the presents she has received: a doll and a 
bucket full of candy. Her crying brother just behind her has been less fortu-
nate: his shoe only contains a rod,1 which one of his sisters is holding up 
while laughing at him. Jan Steen’s message seems simple enough: those who 
are good become deserving of rewards, those who are bad become deserving 
of punishment. Or is it? It appears there is a twist to the story. Look at the 
grandmother at the back. She winks the crying boy, while seeming to reach 
for something behind the curtain. Is she taking out a present to cheer him up? 
The scene in the painting is just one illustration of the central role of 
desert in our everyday lives. Many of us have the intuition, ingrained from a 
very early age onwards, that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve 
and a bad thing if they do not. We are – in the words of Shelly Kagan – 
“friends of desert” (2012, p. 3). This centrality of desert in our thinking would 
seem to make it a good candidate for a principle of distribution of social 
benefits, social burdens, and punishment: to each according to what they 
deserve. Aristotle certainly seemed to favor something of the sort when he 
remarked that “all men agree that what is just in distribution must be accord-
ing to desert in some sense” (quoted in Olsaretti, 2003, p. 3). Similarly, John 
Stuart Mill wrote that “it is universally considered just that each person should 
obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves” (1863/1998, p. 98). 
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Many contemporary political philosophers think rather differently. 
They appear to be a bit like the winking grandmother in the back of 
the painting, resisting the operation of desert as a principle of distribu-
tive justice – a principle that decides how social benefits and burdens 
are distributed. As Scheffler puts it (1992, p. 301): “none of the most 
prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assign 
a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle”.2 It 
appears only luck egalitarian theories are an exception.3 The absence of 
desert in prominent theories of distributive justice is puzzling. How is it 
possible that a notion that is so ingrained in our thinking about what is 
just in distribution plays a rather limited role in philosophical reflection 
on that topic? 
Matters get even more puzzling when one takes a look at contempo-
rary theories of retributive justice – theories about the distribution of 
punishment. In such theories, desert frequently plays a central role.4 It 
seems that our intuitions about desert are reflected much more in discus-
sions of retributive justice than in discussions of distributive justice. This 
has been called the asymmetry of desert thesis.5 Moriarty (2003, p. 512) has 
claimed that we would expect similar principles of justice to operate in 
both spheres of justice, because separating them is to some extent “artifi-
cial”.6 A justification of the asymmetry would show why the arguments for 
assigning desert a certain role in one realm of justice do not apply to the 
other realm. In case no such justification can be found, a re-evaluation of 
the role of desert in distributive and retributive justice may be required, 
so that desert is assigned a similar role in both. So far, Scheffler (2000), 
Smilanksy (2006), and Moriarty (2013) have put forth justifications of the 
asymmetry. 
Moriarty’s (2013) account is the only one that remains uncontested.7 
However, in this paper I argue that it is unconvincing. To make my case, 
I will first flesh out the conception of desert that is at stake in the asym-
metry of desert literature (section 2) and discuss Moriarty’s rationale for 
the asymmetry in greater detail (section 3). In section 4.1-4.3, I will argue 
that the cost asymmetry on which Moriarty bases his rationale8 is not as 
large as he suggests: rewarding retributive desert is more expensive9 and 
rewarding distributive desert less expensive. Additionally, I will claim in 
section 4.4 that for Moriarty’s rationale to be successful, he needs to specify 
when systems of desert-based distribution and retribution are fair enough. 
Currently, he does not do so. These two claims together lead to the 
conclusion (section 5) that Moriarty’s rationale for the asymmetry fails. 
2. What is desert?
There is some agreement amongst philosophers about what the concept10 of 
desert is, but much disagreement about how the concept should be fleshed 
out (McLeod, 2004; Olsaretti, 2004). Let’s start with the agreement. Desert 
is generally conceived of as a three-place relation among a subject (S), object 
(O) and desert base (D). An example would be: Rosemary (S) deserves to 
win the Rotterdam weightlifting contest (O), because she has the strongest 
muscles of all contestants (D). Also, it is typically assumed that the base 
of desert claims must be something about the subject, such as an attribute 
of hers or an act she performed (Feinberg, 1970).11 Most of us would, for 
instance, strongly disagree if someone claimed that Rosemary deserves to 
win the Rotterdam weightlifting contest because her father has stronger 
muscles than all contestants. Finally, desert claims have normative or moral 
force (Olsaretti, 2004, p. 15). To claim that someone deserves something is 
to say that it is a morally good thing if she would get what she deserves.12
2.1. The conception of desert in the asymmetry debate
Philosophers seem to stop agreeing with each other on the topic of desert 
from this point onwards. There is much discussion on what can and should 
be the subjects, objects and especially bases of desert claims (see McLeod, 
2004). Such dissent is mostly absent from the asymmetry of desert litera-
ture.13 All contributors assume that the subjects of desert claims are human 
beings. They take objects to be punishment in the retributive sphere, and 
social benefits and burdens in the distributive sphere – although some14 
narrow down the latter to income and wealth. The base of desert, however, is 
often left unspecified. A possible desert base in the retributive sphere could 
be wrongdoing, while possible bases of distributive desert include effort and 
achievement.15
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All contributors to the debate specify that they talk about prejusti-
cial desert. To see what that means, it is helpful to distinguish prejusticial 
desert from institutional and preinstitutional desert. According to an insti-
tutional theory of desert, desert claims are based on the rules and purposes 
of the institutions of society (McLeod, 2004; Olsaretti, 2004, p. 17; 
Scheffler, 2000). To borrow an example from Rawls (1999): the team that 
scored the most goals while abiding by the rules of soccer deserves to win 
the game. This is a relatively simple conception to use in practice. To know 
what a person deserves, it suffices to apply the rules. However, simpli-
city may come at a cost here, as rules and institutions of society are not 
always just. We all know the feeling that the winning soccer team actually 
deserved to lose. 
By basing desert on a principle of justice, preinstitutional desert 
allows for a discrepancy between desert and the rules and purposes of 
society’s institutions. This conception of desert would make it possible to 
say: the rules of soccer are unjust, because they allow more able teams to 
lose matches. Note that preinstitutional desert is “parasitic” on another 
principle of justice – such as the principle that more able teams should 
get prizes (Olsaretti, 2004, p. 15). It derives its normative force from 
that other principle. Prejusticial desert, on the other hand, is grounded 
in itself. What people deserve is not a function of the rules and purposes 
of institutions, nor of another principle of justice. To ask what is just 
amounts to asking what is deserved.
2.2. The asymmetry of desert
With this conception of desert in mind, it is time to move on to the 
asymmetry itself. Although Moriarty (2003) coined the term asymme-
try of desert, Scheffler (2000) was the first to write about it. He argues 
that Rawls (1999) assigns desert a different role in the distributive and 
retributive spheres of justice.  Rawls insists that desert only has a deriva-
tive role to play in distributive justice,16 but he simultaneously argues 
that it should play a more pronounced role in retributive justice. One 
can see the opposition by comparing the following two passages from 
A theory of justice (1999). 
In the first, Rawls considers the possibility of rewarding desert in the 
distributive realm: 
[I]t is incorrect that individuals with greater natural endowments and 
the superior character that has made their development possible have a 
right to a cooperative scheme that enables them to obtain even further 
benefits in ways that do not contribute to the advantages of others. We 
do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, 
any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That 
we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to 
cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in 
good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life 
for which we can claim no credit. (p. 89)
In the second, he writes about rewarding desert in the retributive realm:
A propensity to commit such [criminal acts] is a mark of bad character, 
and in a just society legal punishments will only fall upon those who 
display these faults. (p. 277) 
The question these passages raise is this: how can Rawls simultaneously 
claim that individuals do not deserve the fruits of their character and 
endowments when it comes to the distribution of primary social goods, 
but should be punished for their bad character? He does not provide an 
answer to this question. Rawls is one of the few philosophers in whose 
work the asymmetry17 can be found, which can be explained by the fact 
that he is one of few philosophers who wrote about both distributive 
and retributive justice. However, Moriarty (2003) and Smilanksy (2006) 
note that the asymmetry is quite a general phenomenon in contempo-
rary theories of retributive and distributive justice. Desert frequently 
plays a fundamental role in the former, but not in the latter. This means 
that even if one does not agree with Scheffler’s (2000) reading of Rawls, 
the asymmetry is worthy of attention. 
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3. Moriarty’s consequentialist rationale: an asymmetry to 
defend the asymmetry
Moriarty is one of the most active contributors to the asymmetry of desert 
literature. Although he previously confessed to having serious doubts 
about whether the asymmetry can be justified (2003, p. 533), he has come 
up with a consequentialist rationale for it in a recent (2013) paper. The 
rationale is based on a difference in the costs of rewarding desert in the 
two spheres of justice. It is consequentialist, because Moriarty assumes 
that a practical consideration – the cost of rewarding desert – can out-
weigh the importance of giving people what they justly deserve. I think 
one could summarize his argument as follows: 
 M1. A case can be made for requiting desert as a matter of justice,
 M2. Requiting desert in the distributive sphere would be very  
          costly,
 M3. Requiting desert in the retributive sphere is not as costly,
 M4. Cost considerations can outweigh the importance of   
          giving people what they justly deserve, 
 M5. Therefore, an asymmetry in the costs of requiting desert  
         between the two spheres of justice could provide a (partial) 
          rationale for the asymmetry of desert.  
To make his case, Moriarty refers to a paper by Arneson (2007) that 
argues that a free market does not reward people according to any plau-
sible conception of distributive desert. He then claims that in order 
to implement desert-based distribution, a planned economy would 
be required. However, history has shown that planned economies are 
terribly inefficient. Requiting desert in the distributive sphere would 
therefore be expensive. This cost argument does not apply in the retri-
butive sphere because much fewer people break criminal law than make 
productive contributions. 
The upshot is that requiting desert is more costly in the distribu-
tive sphere than in the retributive sphere. Such cost considerations can 
be a reason to refrain from allocating all social benefits and burdens 
according to desert. Cost considerations do not justify the asymmetry, 
however, as they do not undermine the case for requiting desert that 
Moriarty assumes (M1). Therefore, one should still try to reward dis-
tributive desert whenever this can be done at a reasonable cost. This 
seems quite possible for the distribution of a substantial number of 
goods: think of scholarships, welfare benefits, transplant organs, and 
work visas. What remains is a residual asymmetry: the whole of peo-
ple’s just share of punishment would be awarded according to desert, 
whereas only part of social benefits and burdens would be distributed in 
accordance with desert. 
4. Bringing some symmetry to Moriarty’s cost asymmetry
It is my contention that the cost asymmetry that Moriarty postulates does 
not succeed at vindicating the asymmetry of desert. To establish this claim, 
I will defend the following argument:
B1. Distributing punishment according to what people deserve is  
  more expensive than Moriarty suggests,
B2. Distributing social benefits and burdens according to what people  
  deserve is less expensive than he suggests,
B3. Estimating the cost of rewarding desert requires the specification  
  of a fairness threshold, 
B4. Moriarty does not specify such a threshold, 
B5. Therefore, Moriarty’s rationale for the asymmetry of desert fails. 
4.1. The cost of rewarding retributive desert
Moriarty (2013) does not ponder how well the criminal justice system 
is doing at rewarding desert. This is remarkable given that he (i) does 
ask this question for the market, (ii) answers that it is doing badly, and 
(iii) then argues that an inefficient planned economy would need to be 
implemented to properly reward distributive desert. Could a similar 
story be told for retributive desert?  
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To arrive at a tentative answer to this question, let’s try to assess how 
well the criminal justice system in the United States is doing at rewarding 
desert. I restrict my attention to the United States here, because that is 
the country Moriarty focuses on. Now, to make the assessment, we need 
to know what it means to punish people according to their desert. In 
essence, it seems to entail giving people (S) punishment (O) grounded 
on a desert base (B). Moriarty does not specify what he takes the base 
for retributive desert to be. Suppose that it were ‘wrongdoing by break-
ing criminal law’.18 Furthermore, assume for now that all the punishments 
for violations of criminal law in the United States are in fact in accord-
ance with desert: no innocent people are arrested and convicted, and the 
punishments that guilty people get are perfectly in accordance with the 
law. 
Even under such unrealistic assumptions, it seems that the U.S. 
criminal justice system is doing a poor job at giving wrongdoers the 
punishments they deserve. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pub-
lishes yearly reports on crime clearance rates for the whole of the United 
States. In these statistics, a crime is marked as ‘cleared’ whenever the 
offender has been arrested or when she/he has been identified but can-
not be arrested due to factors outside of the control of the relevant law 
enforcement agency (FBI, 2014). These are the main clearance rates for 
violent crimes and property crimes of all U.S. law enforcement agencies in 
2013: murder and negligent manslaughter, 64,1%; forcible rape, 40,6%; 
robbery, 29,4%; aggravated assault, 57,7%; burglary, 13,1%; larceny-
theft, 22,4%; and motor vehicle theft, 14,2%. 
The clearance rate for all of these offenses is well below 100%. Note 
that the reported clearance rates include cases in which the known offender 
cannot be arrested and punished. What is more, it is well established in 
criminology that crime is underreported by victims and underrecorded 
by the police (MacDonald, 2002). In other words, a substantial number 
of the crimes committed are not met with any form of legal punishment. 
The perpetrator walks free. I think that these statistics are enough to cast 
serious doubts on the ability of the U.S. criminal justice system to cur-
rently punish wrongdoers in accordance with what they legally deserve. 
Achieving increases in the clearance rate of crimes is likely to come at 
considerable costs: more police on the streets, more surveillance, more 
cases to be tried, more people in prison, and so on. 
If such a costly rise in clearance would need to be realized before it can 
be assumed that wrongdoers are sufficiently punished in accordance with 
their deserts, it seems that the cost asymmetry on which Moriarty bases his 
rationale decreases. This implies that a smaller part of the asymmetry of 
desert can be rationalized by cost considerations. 
4.2. The cost of rewarding distributive desert
The cost asymmetry decreases further if one considers that desert-based 
distribution may be less expensive than Moriarty claims. He argues that 
the (free) market does not reward people according to any reasonable 
conception of individual desert. The only way in which one could reward 
distributive desert is by implementing a planned economy. As history has 
shown time and again, however, planned economies are inefficient, which 
makes rewarding distributive desert an expensive option. What Moriarty 
seems to ignore here though, is that a number of proposals have been put 
forth for combining the efficiency of the market with rewarding distribu-
tive desert. One example is the ‘belasting op bekwaamheid’ (talent tax) 
proposed by the Dutch Nobel prize-winning19 economist Jan Tinbergen 
(1970). His idea is to have people pay a fixed amount of tax each year that 
increases with their capacity to earn. Such a system approaches a desert-
based system of distribution by making people’s incomes less dependent 
on factors outside their control, such as genes and upbringing.  
Plug, Van Praag and Hartog (1998) work out Tinbergen’s sugges-
tion.20 They claim (p. 186) that capacity to earn can be approximated by 
(i) physical health, (ii) cognitive intelligence, (iii) social and emotional 
intelligence, and (iv) gender (men live shorter than women and do not 
bear children). In countries with mandatory education, such informa-
tion could initially be acquired at schools and updated when required. 
Everyone would pay a fixed amount (lump sum) of tax, regardless of how 
many hours he or she works. The height of the tax increases with capacity 
to earn. A system of income taxation based on capacity to earn is likely to 
be more efficient than the current tax system in the United States. There, 
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the marginal tax rate21 increases with income – which creates a disincen-
tive to work harder (p. 207). Also, a talent tax would significantly reduce 
the costs of assessing each year how much income tax people need to pay. 
People’s capacity to earn is unlikely to unpredictably change significantly 
over time.
Talent-based taxation comes with worries too. People may have 
a strong incentive to understate their capacity to earn. However, tax 
administrators could reduce this incentive by making higher education 
admission and job selection for the government (as they already are to 
some extent) dependent upon factors as (ii) cognitive intelligence, and 
(iii) social and emotional intelligence. Additionally, one may worry that 
people’s privacy is infringed upon too much if the government tests peo-
ple for their capacity to earn. I would retort that the current tax system in 
the United States also infringes upon people’s privacy quite a bit. When 
parents apply for financial help (Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies) in the state of Georgia, for instance, they need report whether their 
chil-dren (i) have satisfactory attendance at school, (ii) have been immu-
nized, (iii) have experienced domestic violence, (iv) suffer from physical 
or mental incapacities, and so on (Georgia Department of Human Ser-
vices, 2015). 
The upshot is that if a talent tax could ensure distribution in accord-
ance with desert, it appears that it is less costly to reward distributive 
desert than Moriarty claims. Hence, the cost asymmetry on which he 
bases his rationale would decrease further. 
4.3. The inefficiency of planned economies
There is one more point that is worth mentioning here. Moriarty claims 
that history has shown that planned economies are inefficient and lead to 
a low standard of living. By implication, a planned economy that rewards 
distributive desert will lead to a low standard of living as well. I disagree 
with this inference, because it seems that planned economies that aimed 
to reward individual desert have not really been tried yet. The lion-share 
of the planned economies of at least recent economic history consists 
of the economies that made up the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
(USSR). These economies were notorious for the lack of individual incen-
tives to work harder (Murrell, 1991). 
What factory mangers were paid depended on whether they met 
production targets. Such targets were frequently defined just in terms 
of quantity, which meant that managers had no incentive to (i) produce 
more than the target, and (ii) produce goods of higher quality. Such an 
incentive problem might be less prevalent in planned economies that 
aim at rewarding individual desert. After all, such a system could pro-
vide people with an incentive to become more deserving, whereas such 
incentives were largely absent in the USSR economies. The upshot of 
this is, again, that rewarding distributive desert might not be as expen-
sive as Moriarty claims it to be, even if it would require implementing 
a planned economy. 
4.4. A fairness threshold
Moriarty might respond to my argument by claiming (i) that the U.S. crim-
inal justice system is actually doing sufficiently well in giving people the 
punishments they deserve, and that (ii) in proposals like that of Tinbergen, 
people’s distributive desert is not rewarded in a precise enough manner. 
This brings me to a problem that underlies Moriarty’s rationale for the 
asymmetry. To be able to assess to what extent it is successful, one needs 
to be clear on when a desert-based system of distribution and retribution 
is fair enough. It appears that the lower one sets the fairness threshold for 
rewarding desert, the cheaper it will become to implement desert-based 
systems of distribution and retribution. 
Wolff (2013) claims precisely this when he argues that for any such 
system, there is a tradeoff between feasibility and fairness. ‘Feasibility’ refers 
to the idea that the information required for requiting an individual’s desert 
can be approximated at reasonable costs. The lower these costs are, the more 
feasible a system for requiting desert is. ‘Fairness’ considerations typically 
pull in the opposite direction. They refer to the extent in which a measure 
of desert really captures an individual’s desert. The cheaper one’s measure 
of desert is, the less likely this is to be the case. To see this more clearly, it is 
helpful to think of requiting distributive desert in accordance with effort. 
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If we were to aim at rewarding effort corrected for differences in genetic 
endowment and upbringing, we would naturally need to gather informa-
tion about these two factors. Approximating this information by education 
level would be quite cheap, but might be unfair. After all, the education 
level that people obtain is likely to be determined both by their effort-
making ability, but also the ability-corrected effort they exerted. We only 
aim to correct for the former, but not the latter. A fairer measure would be 
to establish people’s effort-making ability by submitting them to a full day 
of testing. Doing so for the whole population of a country, however, would 
be expensive. This, in a nutshell, is the tradeoff between the feasibility and 
fairness of rewarding desert.  
The success of Moriarty’s rationale for the asymmetry of desert stands 
or falls with what tradeoff between fairness and feasibility he deems 
acceptable. I have claimed that little would be left of his rationale if he 
would deem desert-rewarding systems as the talent tax fair enough, and 
the current criminal justice system in the United States unfair. Whether 
Moriarty would do so, is guesswork: he does not explicitly consider the 
tradeoff. Therefore, I claim that (B5) his rationale for the asymmetry of 
desert fails. 
5. Conclusion
The asymmetry of desert is a fascinating puzzle. It can be solved either by 
providing a justification for the asymmetry, or by assigning desert a similar 
role in distributive and retributive justice. This paper critically evaluated 
Moriarty’s consequentialist rationale for the asymmetry. He claims that 
an asymmetry in the costs of rewarding desert between the distributive 
and retributive sphere can (partially) vindicate the asymmetry of desert. I 
claimed that (B1) rewarding desert in the retributive sphere might be more 
expensive than Moriarty seems to think. At the same time, (B2) rewarding 
desert in the distributive sphere may not be as expensive as he suggests. 
Combining these two claims, it turns out that the cost asymmetry that 
underlies Moriarty’s consequentialist rationale is not as large as he makes 
it out to be. In addition, I argued that the success of Moriarty’s defense 
of the asymmetry hinges on the (B3) specification of a fairness threshold 
for desert-based systems of distribution and retribution. As Moriarty does 
(B4) not specify such a threshold, it appears that (B5) his rationale fails. 
Should political theorists become more or less like the desert-upsetting 
grandmother in Jan Steen’s painting? The disappointing but simultane-
ously hopeful answer is: I do not know, yet. This paper criticized the last 
defense of the asymmetry of desert that remained uncontested. However, 
new justifications could be found. In my view, the way forward is further 
conceptual reflection upon distributive and retributive desert – in the line 
of recent work by Olsaretti (2004), Kagan (2012), and Walen (2014). So 
far, the assumption in the asymmetry of desert debate has been that similar 
conceptions of desert are at stake in both spheres of justice. I highly doubt 
this assumption. This raises a new question: if there are different concep-
tions of desert at stake in theories of distributive and retributive justice, to 
what extent can one still speak of an asymmetry of desert that is in need of 
justification? This is a question for a different paper. 
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Notes
1. Symbolizing an instrument with which bad children would be whipped. 
2. The term ‘fundamental principle’ here refers to a preinstitutional and prejusticial notion 
of desert. I will explain what such a notion of desert is in the next section. 
3. Luck egalitarians such as Cohen and Dworkin argue that unequal distribution only 
is morally permissible if it is the result of deliberate, calculated gambles by people. 
Concomitantly, inequalities are impermissible if they are the result of ‘brute luck’ factors 
such as genetic endowment and upbringing. Lippert-Rasmussen (2014) provides an over-
view of the many variants of luck egalitarian theories.
4. See, for instance, Olsaretti (2003), Smilansky (2006), and Walen (2014). 
5. See Moriarty (2003, 2013), and Smilansky (2006). 
 6. See Moriarty (2003) for a more elaborate argument on why the asymmetry of desert is 
in need of justification. I will not repeat it here, but simply assume that the asymmetry is 
indeed in need of justification.  
 7. Scheffler’s (2000) justification has been challenged by, amongst others, Moriarty (2003) 
and Miller (2003). Smilansky’s was challenged by Moriarty (2013). Note that Scheffler 
(2003) published a more refined version of his justification to accommodate some of the 
criticisms he received. This ‘updated’ justification has not received critical scrutiny yet. 
8. When talking about his rationale for the asymmetry of desert, Moriarty (2013) 
occasionally uses the word ‘justification’. I think this is confusing, because he actually 
argues that the asymmetry could be unjust, but we might leave it intact because it would 
be costly to eliminate it. Consequently, I will consistently talk about Moriarty’s rationale 
in this paper from now on. 
9. Note that Moriarty does not specify what he takes ‘expensive’ and ‘costly’ to mean. I took 
these terms to denote not only monetary costs, but also feasibility concerns. 
10. I am here using the word ‘concept’ as defined by Rawls (1999, p. 5). It refers to the 
structure of the term ‘desert’: a three-place relation between subject, object and desert base. 
A conception of desert would be a concept of desert in which the subject, object and desert 
base are specified.
11. Desert claims are typically backward-looking (i.e. based on past and/or current 
attributes or acts), although David Schmidtz (2011) has recently published a plea for 
forward-looking desert. 
12. There is disagreement, however, about whether desert claims can or should be able to 
ground obligations.
13. This is claimed, inter alia, by Moriarty (2003, p. 519). 
14. Smilansky (2006) does that, for instance. 
15. Note, however, that there are many other possibilities. See, for instance, Wolff (2003, 
pp. 220-221).
16. Note that this interpretation is contested. Scanlon (1986) and Sandel (1982) interpret 
Rawls as assigning the same role to desert in both the distributive and the retributive sphere. 
17. Scheffler (2000) and Moriarty (2003) claim this. 
18. Of course, the notion of desert being discussed in the literature on the desert asymme-
try is prejusticial, so might not coincide with criminal law at all times. This, among other 
reasons, is why I call my answer to the question how well the U.S. criminal justice system 
is doing at rewarding retributive desert ‘tentative’. I decided to focus on criminal law here 
for two reasons. First, it is the best proxy for a prejusticial notion of retributive desert that 
I can think of for which data are available. Second, Moriarty cites statistics of the United 
States criminal justice system as well, and I am responding to his argument. 
19. I am well aware that it is actually the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
memory of Alfred Nobel, and that Alfred Nobel did not include this award in his testa-
ment. All this is besides the point of the paper. 
20. An elaboration on Tinbergen’s suggestion was needed; the article in which Tinbergen 
calls for the talent tax is only three pages long. 
21. The tax paid on an additional dollar earned. 
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